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A new and remarkable Green Paper about how to trade Greenhouse gases (GHG) in 
the EU has recently been published by the Commission of the European Union. This 
to achieve the stated 8% reduction target level. The Green Paper raises ten questions 
about how greenhouse gas permit trading should be designed in the EU before year 
2005. These ten questions can be compressed into four main issues, namely target 
group, allocation of emission allowances, how to mix emission trading with other 
instruments and fourth enforcement. In the literature, there is a strong need to guide 
decision-makers and stimulate academic debates concerning the actual design of a 
simple and workable GHG market model for the EU. This model must take both 
economic, administrative and political concerns into account so that it is feasible in 
practice. Based on our findings, we therefore develop a policy recommendation 
concerning the future design of GHG permit trading in the EU. 
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  1 1: Introduction 
 
The main focus of this paper is the application of emissions trading in European 
energy policy. The Commission of the European Union  has published a 'Green Paper' 
about how to trade Greenhouse gases (GHG) in Europe, see CEU (2000a).  Several 
books have dealt with emission trading in general such as Baumol and Oates (1988), 
Daugbjerg and Svendsen (2001), Dijkstra (1999), Svendsen (1998), Tietenberg (1985; 
2000) and Wallart (1999). Still, no books have so far analyzed the recently proposed 
GHG market in the EU (Green Paper from 2000 by the EU Commission). Svendsen 
(1998) first suggested such a market scheme for GHG in the EU. However, this idea 
needs much more elaboration concerning design – this is the task here. 
 
As the EU Commission notes, GHG emissions at European level have been increasing 
instead of decreasing. Without a reinforcement of current policy measures, the 
‘business-as-usual-scenario’ is likely to result in an 8% increase in year 2012 rather 
than the wanted 8% decrease compared to 1990 levels, CEU (2000b). Therefore, the 
European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) was launched in June 2000 to bring 
together all relevant stakeholders to co-operate in the preparatory work of common 
and co-ordinated policies and measures to reduce GHG emissions. Emission trading 
will be the key policy in this setting (ibid). 
 
Acknowledging the considerable interest in emissions trading in the climate change 
debate, the EU Environment Commissioner Margot Wallström said in March 2000 
that “The Green Paper rightly advocates a prudent commencement of emissions 
trading that, if successful, can be extended. It must be understood that we are breaking 
new ground with such a system and we need to get it right from the start. However, I 
am firmly convinced that it can work if we put into place a strong framework with 
adequate controls. Then emissions trading will ensure that emission reductions will be 
made where they are cheapest and hence we will all benefit economically. It’s not just 
about leaving things to market forces, but creating the necessary structures in which 
cost-effective incentives can exist” (CEU, 2000b). Thus, in order to guide decision-
makers and stimulate academic debates, there is a strong need for policy proposals 
concerning the actual design of a GHG market model for the EU. This model must 
take both economic, administrative and political concerns into account so that it is 
feasible in practice.  
 
According to the Kyoto Protocol, the deadline for introducing such a market is 2008. 
This dead-line may even be brought forward to the year 2005 according to the EU 
Green Paper which raises 10 questions about how permit trading should be designed. 
These 10 points can be compressed into four main issues, which we deal with in the 
following four sections, namely target group (questions 1-4) in Section 2, allocation 
of emission allowances (questions 5-6) in Section 3, 3) how to mix emission trading 
with other instruments (questions 7-8) in Section 4, and the crucial issue of 
enforcement (questions 9-10) in Section 5. Based on these findings, Section 6 
develops a policy recommendation concerning the future design of GHG permit 




  2 2: Target group 
 
2.1 Choice of pollutant and sector 
On one hand, we want to cover as much of total emissions as possible in the EU by 
our emissions permit system to achieve the 8% GHG target levels in a cost-effective 
way. On the other hand, we have to weight these benefits against monitoring and 
enforcement costs. Monitoring costs consist of the costs of measuring emissions. 
Enforcement costs consist of the costs of assessing whether there is compliance with 
the policy measure (whether permit rights are equal to emissions) and the costs of 
prosecuting violators. If the monitoring and enforcement costs required to keep 
violation within set limits for a source exceed the contribution of the source to 
reducing total abatement costs, it would be cost effective to exclude the source from 
control (ABARE, 1998).  
 
Varming et al. (2000, 136-37) argue that an emission-trading scheme covering only 
CO2 emissions from the power and steam sector as being a sensible starting point. 
There are two main arguments in favor of CO2 as the target pollutant. First, CO2 
emissions are by far the largest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions and will 
remain so for any foreseeable future. Second, CO2 emissions stems almost entirely 
from fossil fuel use and it is easy to monitor.  
 
Next, the choice of the electricity sector as target group is based on five main reasons. 
First, the electricity sector is responsible for one-third of total CO2 emissions in the 
EU. In comparison, the industrial sector emit one-sixth and households one-fifth (EU 
1999). Second, many low-cost CO2 emission reduction opportunities exist within the 
electricity sector. Third, the companies are relatively well-informed of the overall 
opportunities to reduce CO2 emissions in the market, which can work to encourage 
trading early on. Fourth, this sector is already tightly regulated. Fifth, it is, based on 
the US experience, crucial to start with a single sector to make the system as simple as 
possible. 
 
The single focus on CO2 emissions from a single sector cannot be the final answer 
since emissions of other greenhouse gases and other sectors make a significant 
contribution as well. If emission reductions of the other greenhouse gases are to be 
achieved by applying other policy instruments, it is likely to result in differentiated 
treatment of different sectors and gases. From an overall efficiency viewpoint this is 
not preferable. However, getting a tradable permit system underway at all is likely to 
pose a significant political challenge and in this respect it makes sense to start out 
with a limited system, as long as it will not prevent a more cost-effective solution to 
emerge later on. 
 
Thus, as suggested by Varming et al. (2000), an EU permit market could, for a start, 
include all boilers larger than 25 MW, similar to the delimitation of the target group in 
the US Acid Rain Program. Table 1 shows the total number of boilers in the EU with 
different primary fuels. The total number of fossil-fuelled boilers in the EU amounted 
to 7038 in 1999, while the number of boilers larger than 25 MW amounted to 1690. 
The 1690 boilers are in the same order of magnitude as the US Acid Rain Program, 
  3 which has proven to be a workable number. Secondly, the total number legal entities 
is reduced from 2959 to 375 while most of the installed capacity of fossil-fuelled 
boilers is still included in the market. As you can see, coal drops from 162 to 160, oil 
from 83 to 72 and gas from 75 to 66 GW. In other words, most of the emissions are 
still kept within the system. By doing this the administrative procedures can be 
developed and prepared for a larger scheme. 
 
 
Table 1: Number of units and legal entities with different primary fuels in the EU, 
1999. 
  







Number of fossil 
fuelled boilers  916  2713  4280  7038 2959 
Installed capacity by 
primary fuel, GW  162  83 75  -  - 
Number of fossil 
fuelled boilers > 25 
MW 
695  492 579  1690  375 
Installed capacity by 
primary fuel, GW 
160  72 66  -  - 
 




2.2 The risk of price manipulation. 
The crucial question is whether a CO2 market for these 375 companies will be 
competitive. Here, we need to consider the risk of price manipulation both in the 
permit market itself and from using the permit market to exclude competition in the 
product market of electricity (see Tietenberg 1985 and Svendsen (1998). Let us look 
at both possibilities in turn. 
 
First, concerning price manipulation in the permit market, a dominating source (or a 
coalition of sources) may attempt to manipulate the price as a monopolist or a 
monopsonist. This market power depends on the firm’s size relative to the market in 
which it is operating. If the dominating source offers too few permits, it can exert 
monopoly power by raising the price. If the dominating source buys too few permits, 
it can exert monopsony power by reducing the price. In both cases, the source may 
achieve a net gain at the expense of the cost-effective outcome. 
 
The risk of price manipulation in the permit market and the strategic interaction can 
be assessed by using an m-firm concentration ratio. This index simply adds up the m 
highest market shares in the industry and the risk of price manipulation is simply 
expected to increase with higher market shares, see Tirole (1990).  
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We have found the following result for the electricity sector in the EU: 
 
Table 2: Market shares for the EU power sector in the electricity market and the CO2, 
market, 1996/1997. 
 Electricity  market 
shares 
CO2 market shares  
(electricity producers) 
CO2 market shares 
(emitters) 
R5  38 %    25 %  34 % 
R10 51  %    40 %  44 % 
R15 58  %    43 %  49 % 
Source: Company data collected from 1997 Annual Reports and Environmental 
Reports. Total production and emission figures from 1996 calculated from IEA 
Electricity Information 1997 and 1998 edition, see Varming et al. (2000). 
 
 
Table 2 shows that the five largest companies (legal entities) have an electricity 
market share of 38 % and are responsible for 25  % of the CO2 emissions. 
Furthermore, the five largest CO2 emitters have a CO2 market share of 34%. Even 
though such an index is at best only indicative of the possibility of market power 
being present in the CO2 market, the numbers indicate that the electricity sector is 
indeed suitable as a starting point for emissions trading. 
 
 
Second, the risk concerning strategic interaction between these two seemingly 
competitive markets must be considered.  The incentive to exclude competitors in the 
product market by keeping them out of the permit market may cause monopolistic 
behavior as a source – or a group of sources – may refuse to sell permits to new 
entrants and thereby create a barrier to entry, i.e. a cost of production. This extra cost 
must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms 
already in the industry’ (Stigler , 1968:67). Such a ‘predatory’ source may in this way 
increase its opportunities for manipulating the price in the product market (Tietenberg 
1985: 138). This behaviour must be considered here as the two engaging sources are 
direct competitors in the same product market (electricity), emitting the same 
pollutant (CO2) in the same regulated area (European Union). 
 
 
The risk of possible strategic interaction between the output market and permit market 
is depicted in Figure 1. Here, the electricity market shares as well as the CO2 market 













































































































































































































































































































































Note: CO2 market shares have simply been calculated as the percentage of total CO2 
emissions from power production that stems from individual power companies.  
 
Source: Company data collected from 1997 Annual Reports and Environmental 
Reports. Total production and emission figures from 1996 calculated from IEA 
Electricity Information 1997 and 1998 edition, see Varming et al. (2000) 
 
 
Figure 1 shows, that the largest companies, are not among the highest emitters of 
CO2, e.g. the EDF is the largest electricity producer but is one of the smallest CO2 
emitters. Thus, the fact that the electricity producers holding the largest production 
shares are different from those holding the largest CO2 shares also suggest, that the 
electricity sector can form the basis of a competitive CO2 market in the EU. In other 
words, the EDF cannot, as a small CO2 emitter influence the entry to the electricity 
market by refusing to sell CO2 permits to a potential competitor; it is easy for the 
competitor to buy the needed CO2 permits from other emitters that are small in the 
electricity market. 
 
After initiating a CO2 market for the EU electricity sector, the administrative 
procedures can, if the market works, be developed and prepared for a larger scheme. 
In the long run, it should, as is the case in the US Acid Rain Program, be possible for 
other CO2 emitters to opt-in and join the market if it pays them, e.g. a larger industrial 
plant may take advantage of such a rule (Svendsen, 1998). Overall, we suggest that it 
will be possible to reduce the number of boilers to 1690 and still keep most of the 
emissions in the system and still keep the market competitive.  
 
However, the electricity sector should not be seen in a static perspective. The 
changing frame conditions following the liberalisation directive for the electricity and 
gas sectors have started to provoke a response from the industry itself. It seems clear 
  6 that the size of a company is a shaping factor with regard to the type and dimension of 
risks that can be accepted and the ability to expand into new markets and businesses 
clearly depends hereon. So far, we have seen a tendency towards horizontal 
integration between power companies as well as power companies buying up 
distribution companies. Within the last few years, several of the larger companies in 
have merged (or have announced plans to do so). This is true for EdF/EnBW, 
PreussenElektra/Bayernwerke and RWE/VEW. This process is expected to proceed 
and the result will probably be only a handful of large companies within a relatively 
short period of time. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that electricity has to be supplied via a grid makes the 
competitive situation quite unique. As there are no economically viable storage 
opportunities for electricity, supply has to equal demand at all times. This is coupled 
with the fact that the flow of electricity in a grid is governed by the law of physics and 
cannot be allocated in a certain direction. Thirdly, the power loss in a grid rises 
quadratically with the current and linearly with the distance. What all this means is 
that the competitive situation of a specific power plant can change dramatically during 
the day, week or year. At some hours the power plant may be exposed to competition 
by a range of other suppliers while at another time of day the competitive situation 
may be more like a local monopoly.  
 
The transmission capacities and the way the usage of this transmission capacity is 
priced determine the extent to which a Danish power plant will compete with a Dutch 
power plant. Even though a system with free third-party access to the transmission 
grid is established, securing that future investments in the transmission grid will 
actually reflect the scarcity in the grid can also be a potentially contentious issue, 
especially with regard to the building of international transmission capacity. However, 
as long as primary energy is by large cheaper to move around than electricity, there 
will be no need for moving around a substantial volume of base load electricity from 
the southernmost part of the EU to the northernmost part. 
 
 
3: Allocation  
In terms of allocation, we simply suggest that each electric utility gets the right to 
match its 1990 emissions for nothing, that is the permits would be ‘grandfathered’. 
Permit allocation would then be defined according to the nominal Kyoto emission 
target levels starting in 1990. Utilities established after 1990 could be eligible for a 
free, initial standard distribution, if they apply before a certain deadline (Svendsen 
1998). Whether the electricity sector in a country should take over the same 
percentage reduction as its country is a more open question. E.g., Denmark is 
obligated to reduce GHG by 21% meaning that its electricity sector would have to 
take over the same 21% reduction obligation. In contrast, e.g. Sweden is allowed to 
increase its GHG emissions by 4%.   Such a ‘take-over’ approach may therefore 
distort competition in a single market for electricity. Still, as the electricity sector 
dominates domestic GHG emissions anyhow, we suggest that the starting point for 
further EU negotiations should be that a sector ‘takes over’ the national target level. 
  7  
Each legal entity in the electricity sector will then receive individual permits, each 
giving the right to emit e.g. 1 tonne of CO2. Each permit will specify the year of issue 
(vintage year) and once the permit has been used to show compliance it will be 
withdrawn from the market. The duration of the compliance period is set to one year. 
Note, that the entitlement is not a full property right but rather a limited permission to 
emit CO2. This approach has also been used in the US and it allows the government to 
make changes over time without any compensation to the market participants 
(Svendsen, 1998). Obviously, any changes in the entitlement to CO2 permits have to 
be done with extreme caution, since a full property right is essential for a well 
functioning market. Thus, it is important that a credible economic value of CO2 
permits is established for a considerable time period reflecting the long investment 
horizons in the power sector. Any alterations in the overall allocation of permits to the 
permit market must be the economic responsibility of the EU and not the market 
participants. E.g., the EU must buy up permits in the market to reduce emission levels 
further so that extra costs are not suddenly imposed on market participants. To 
maximise flexibility in the market, the system should allow for unlimited banking of 
permits as well. 
 
Finally, concerning allocation of the GHG permits, we propose that the EC should 
undertake a yearly EU-wide auction where all or a large share of the permits are put 
out for sale. The inclusion of a large share of the permits, e.g. 10 % of all permits in 
circulation, in the auction will secure equal access to the permits in all the Member 
States and thus an efficient allocation of the permits. Furthermore, this will provide 
price information and transparency to the market, which is important especially in the 
beginning when market participants are not that familiar with the market (Christensen 
and Svendsen, 1999). 
 
We propose to use a non-discriminatory pricing principle for the auction where all 
bidders of permits pay the clearing price for the permits (provided that their bid was 
below the clearing price). The non-discriminatory auction provides important 
information to the market and works fine except in the case of a few very dominant 
market actors
1. The revenue from the auction is redistributed to the legal entities 
according to the overall distribution of responsibilities that is decided upon. The 
actual redistribution of the revenue to market participants could be left to the 
discretion of Member States with regulatory oversight by the Commission. 
 
To make sure that there are buyers as well as sellers in the permit market and that the 
risk sharing capabilities of the marketplace will come into play, everybody should be 
allowed to participate in the market. Obviously, this includes brokers and traders as 
well. Brokers will offer arrangements (bilateral contracts) that hedge the price risk of 
buyers and sellers in the permit market. Experience from the US SO2 market have 
shown that contracts that address the volume risk directly and not necessarily the 
                                                        
1 Neither a non-discriminatory (uniform) pricing principle nor a discriminatory (“pay-your-bid”) 
pricing principle is fully efficient because it can be shown that bidding your true demand curve is 
dominated by other strategies. If market power is not significant, the uniform pricing principle is nearly 
efficient (See Cramton & Kerr, 1998). 
  8 price risk are likely to be introduced, i.e. weather hedges. Traders (or speculators) on 
the other hand, take open positions in the permit market and speculate in future price 
changes. This adds liquidity to the market and reduces the difference between bids by 
buyers and sellers. Like in the US the system could start before the first compliance 
period. Possibly, the regulators should also release permits that are valid in the current 
year as well as permits that are valid in years to come (i.e. selling vintage year 2008 
permits and vintage year 2013 permits at the same time) (Varming et al 2000: 122). 
 
 
4: Mix of instruments 
 
Monitoring and enforcement costs are likely to be too high to make it worthwhile to 
include all smaller polluters. All plants or households that are not included in the 
market should be regulated by a tax or some other measure to ensure that they are 
faced with approximately the same cost per unit of emissions. Also, if monitoring 
costs are found to be too large for some smaller industrial plants these should be 
regulated by a tax or some other measure to ensure that they are faced with 
approximately the same cost per unit of emissions. 
 
Green taxation in relation to small polluters is not only the right solution for economic 
reasons. Also political reasons point strongly to the proposed mix of economic 
instruments where a grandfathered permit market is used in relation to big polluters 
and green taxation is used in relation to small polluters. Svendsen et al. (2001) shows 
how big and well-organized industrial plants successfully has lobbied against green 
taxation, whereas small polluters, such as consumers, have been less successful. The 
large group of households has difficulties to organize because the net benefits for 
individual household action are negative; it does not pay to take initiative and 
organize the whole group for collective action and capture the total net benefits. 
Therefore, due to weak lobbying power, households are presumably taxed much 
higher than the well-organized and strong industry lobby. With a large difference 
between the CO2 tax rate applicable to the households and the one applicable to the 
industry in the OECD countries, it is clear that considerations of the effect on industry 
has been taken into account when formulating the environmental policy. On average 
over the five cases, households are met with a tax rate four times higher than that of 
the industry, and further, if the tax advantage of the industry is included, it increases 
to six times the size. This indicates that the empirical findings confirm the theoretical 
conclusions on organized interest groups influencing the tax policy decisions (ibid.). 
 
A permit market, on the other hand, is politically more attractive to the organized 
polluters than a tax scheme due to the possibility of a free, initial distribution (grand-
fathering). Here, Daugbjerg and Svendsen  (2001) derived a formula for the 
distributional effects of these two economic instruments. It showed that for target 
levels, such as the Danish case of a 20% CO2 reduction or the EU case of 8% CO2 
reduction, the tax solution (without refund) was nine and twenty-four times more 
costly for polluters respectively than the grandfathered permit market, provided that 
the MC curves are linear. For large and influential polluters, such as the electric utility 
industry, this makes the grandfathered permit system a much more attractive 
environmental policy measure than green taxes (ibid.). 




The purpose of the control system is to make the whole trading scheme credible by 
assuring that there is a one-to-one correspondence between a permit to emit one tonne 
of CO2 and the actual emission of one tonne of CO2. Avoidance of cheating in the 
system is crucial to make it work. At present two monitoring mechanisms of national 
emissions exists (Varming et al, 2000: 134): First, a national reporting to the 
secretariat of the UNFCCC, and second, an  EU monitoring mechanism. 
 
The  national reporting to the UNFCCC is at present a relatively slow reporting 
system giving a time lag of 1-2 years between the timing of emissions and reporting. 
Even though this reporting may be speeded up it will probably continue to be too slow 
to serve as market information. 
 
Despite its modest and technical name, the ’EU monitoring mechanism’ must be 
considered the cornerstone of the EU climate policy in the second half of the 1990s. 
Adopted in June 1993, it obliges member countries to develop national programs for 
reducing greenhouse gases while the Commission evaluates the data provided by the 
member countries. An important feature of the monitoring mechanism is that it 
introduces additional and more specified commitments than the FCCC. However, 
inadequate reporting by the member countries has so far reduced its effectiveness. 
(Ringius, 1999)  
 
As Varming et al. (2000:18) argue, the emissions data can be collected by means of 
self-reporting by the companies.  The most important role to be played by EC 
institutions will be to establish minimum requirements with regard to the 
measurement of emissions while to a large extent leaving actual monitoring and 
verification of emissions to the Member State Governments. The annual reporting of 
emissions from the power and steam sector must be faster than today. The final data 
for the preceding year should be available in January in order to allow for a true-up 
period for the emission rights. To give the best possible market information it is 
proposed to report and publish emission data for companies included in the trading 
scheme on a monthly basis. This will mean speeding up of the existing reporting 
procedures, but it should be possible to do this with only minor extra costs. Member 
States could then verify the emissions reported by companies on a yearly basis and 
submit their result to an EC institution. Obviously, the Member States might have 
incentives to cheat as well, however, the scope for cheating should be relatively small 
with respect to the power and steam sector.  
 
Next, a central registry must be created at the EU level. This function can be 
computerised and should not give any theoretical or practical difficulties, which has 
been clearly demonstrated by the US Acid Rain programme. Data for emissions may 
be collected by national authorities but shall at once be transmitted to a European 
institution. Through the trading system, a registry of permit holdings of each of the 
actors in the market is established. Likewise, through the monitoring process, a 
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enforcement is to compare the two numbers for each actor and have the necessary 
authority to deter actors from breaking the emission limits.  
 
First of all, we need to deter cheating by companies. Taking into consideration that 
the likelihood of detecting cheating is pretty high in this trading scheme, it will 
probably not be necessary with sanctions such as prison sentences to deter cheating. A 
high monetary sanction should be sufficient. The next step will be to establish 
sanctions against market participants exceeding their permit holdings. The suggestion 
here is straightforward. Market participants whose emissions are exceeding their 
current permit holdings must pay a fine for their excess emissions. The level of the 
fine must be the same in all Member States. Otherwise, there could be carbon leakage 
to areas with lower fine levels. 
 
If the fine is kept very low, the emissions trading scheme will work very much like a 
price instrument (tax), whereas a high fine will secure that the emission target is 
reached (at any cost to society). Thus, a relatively low fine is proposed for the trading 
scheme, and the fine could be set in the neighbourhood of 40 EUR/tCO2 which is 
probably sufficiently well above the expected market prices (ibid). The fine payments 
could be used by the enforcement institution to buy emissions permits internationally, 
in order to secure that the overall emission target of the trading system is met (ibid.). 
 
If emission trading is organised as proposed above with a single emissions target for 
all market participants, the issue of enforcement is ‘reduced’ to securing the 
individual compliance of all actors. Thus, in the context of a EU scheme of emissions 
trading it would be natural that the ultimate responsibility for ensuring compliance 
will be on a European level. One could argue that monitoring and enforcement in 
relation to the companies from the starting point will be a Member State task, because 
the Member State Authorities are equipped with the necessary regulatory power in 
relation to the private parties. On the other hand, the system could gain in general 
efficiency and credibility by the establishment of a common super-national European 
institution. It is important that the control system overall is administered by one single 
and central authority so that local authorities do not have the full control 
responsibility and as such are not tempted to protect their own firms. This could be 
the CEU (Commission of the European Union) which will have a bureaucratic self-
interest in handling the system and thereby get access to higher budgets. 
 
The direct measurement of CO2 emissions is expensive. As noted by (UNCTAD 
1995), it is also unnecessary since accurate estimates can be made on the basis of the 
volume of carbon-based fuels that are burnt. All that is required is therefore that the 
flow of fuels is being monitored. In terms of monitoring of emissions, calculating the 
CO2 emissions from the fuel input is a very cheap and efficient method and the scope 
for cheating will be low because there is a close relation between fuel input and 
electricity output for a given plant. Both amounts can be found in the financial 
accounts of the company, accounts that are verified by external auditors.  
 
  11 Still, for coal fired plants a number of complications are involved in calculating the 
emissions from the fuel input. To estimate CO2 emissions from the content of carbon 
in the fuel it can be necessary to distinguish between coal of different origins as the 
carbon content can differ substantially. As an example, the yearly weighted average of 
CO2 emissions from the types of coal used by the Energy Company ELSAM is 95 
grams of CO2 per MJ. The emissions from the different types of coal lie in the range 
of 87 grams of CO2 per MJ as is the case with coal from Canada and a maximum of 
100 grams per MJ as is the case with coal from Great Britain. The variation in the 
yearly CO2 emissions per MJ from any particular power plant is low, though (lies 
within a range of ± 1  %). If the emissions were to be reported every month the 
resulting variation in CO2 emissions per MJ would be higher. This would make it 
practically harder to come up with a precise estimate of the CO2 emissions, since 
closer attention must be paid to what type of coal is actually being used at every given 
point in time. This is not always obvious, as different types of coal usually get mixed 
when lying on a storage yard. It also must be taken into account that part of the coal is 
left unburned in the ashes. This share varies between individual plants depending on 
the design. For pulverised coal firing the typical fraction of unburned is 5 %, but 
within a range of 3-10 %. For grate firing the typical fraction of unburned fuel in the 
ashes is as high as 30-40 %. Grate firing is a technology that is ‘dying’, but a number 
of small, mainly industrial plants still exist. Finally, there is also a marginal emission 
of CO2 from limestone used for desulphurisation. (Varming et al., 2000: 133) 
 
As described, there are a number of uncertainties that must be handled if fuel input 
shall be used to calculate CO2 emissions from coal fired plants. These uncertainties 
have to be weighted against the uncertainties of direct measurement. It is well known 
that it is quite easy to make very accurate measurements of the concentration of CO2 
in a gas, but measuring the flow of flue gas is much more uncertain. Following 
another line of argument, (ABARE, 1998) notes that it would be desirable to base 
required permit holdings on a direct measurement of emissions since technologies are 
being developed for the post combustion capture and disposal of carbon dioxide 
emissions. However, these technologies are far from being economical at the moment 
due to large energy and investment costs. The argument is thus not very strong. 
 
In conclusion, calculating the CO2 emissions from the fuel input is a very cheap and 
efficient method. This will be relevant for many of the smallest installations and thus 
not put a lower limit to the size of plant that can be part of the trading scheme. For 
coal fired plants the uncertainties can be so large that direct measurement should be 
preferred. These installations are usually large and the extra costs for measurement of 
CO2 emissions will be of minor importance. As long as the levels of uncertainties are 
comparable (in fact, as long as the uncertainties are not biased so that they sum out 
over time), the use of different methods of measuring will pose no difficulties. 
 
 
6: Policy recommendation 
 
Our research question was stimulated by a gap in the literature on how to design 
greenhouse gas permit trading in the EU. This is important if the EU is to accomplish 
  12 its stated 8% reduction target level following the Kyoto Protocol. Our policy 
recommendations concerning the four main design issues in the Green Paper by the 
Commission of the European Union, are summarized in Table 3. 
 
 




1. Target Group  
 
The electricity sector should initially be allowed 
to trade CO2 emissions. This points to a 
competitive market consisting of 375 agents 
(legal entities) where no single firm seems 
capable of manipulating the permit price nor 
using the permit market as a barrier to the product 
market of electricity. If the system works, major 





Electricity sector ‘takes over’ the national target 
level and gets its 1990 emission levels for free 
(grandfathering). The GHG permits are defined in 
terms of one year and the EU has the economic 
responsibility concerning possible future 
reductions. Also, an annual, revenue-neutral 
auction, where 10% of the permits in circulation 
are sold, should be linked to the market. 
 
 




Grandfathered permit markets should be used in 
relation to big and well-organized polluters (such 
as the electricity sector) whereas green taxation 
should be used in relation to small and badly 







Self-reporting by the companies to member states 
surveyed by a supra-national authority could be 
an appropriate way to collect emissions data. The 
Commission of the European Union could be this 
authority independent from local interests and in 
charge of a central registry. It is technically 
feasible to calculate CO2 emissions from the fuel 
input in a cheap and efficient way. The fine for 
cheating could probably be set at the level of 40 
EUR/tCO2 which is likely to be sufficient to deter 
potential defectors in the system.  
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